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ABSTRACT
Two paradigms have shown that people automatically compute what or where
another person is looking at. In the visual perspective-taking paradigm,
participants judge how many objects they see; whereas, in the gaze cueing
paradigm, participants identify a target. Unlike in the former task, in the latter
task, the inﬂuence of what or where the other person is looking at is only
observed when the other person is presented alone before the task-relevant
objects. We show that this discrepancy across the two paradigms is not due to
differences in visual settings (Experiment 1) or available time to extract the
directional information (Experiment 2), but that it is caused by how attention is
deployed in response to task instructions (Experiment 3). Thus, the mere
presence of another person in the ﬁeld of view is not sufﬁcient to compute
where/what that person is looking at, which qualiﬁes the claimed automaticity
of such computations.
ARTICLE HISTORY Received 18 August 2015; Accepted 11 December 2015
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Our ability to compute what people see, known as visual perspective-taking
(VPT), offers us very useful information during our social interactions
(Baron-Cohen, 1995); it helps in understanding what other people talk
about, what they like or dislike, what they intend to do, and what knowledge
or beliefs of the world they form. Thus, VPT is an essential building block of
“Theory of Mind”, that is, our ability to reason about other people’s mental
states (Premack & Woodruff, 1978).
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The most basic form of VPT, also referred to as level 1 VPT, allows us to infer
what someone else can or cannot see (as opposed to level 2 VPT which allows
us to infer that an object may have a different appearance to someone else;
Flavell, Everett, Croft, & Flavell, 1981). Level 1 VPT is known to be an early
developing ability in children (Flavell et al., 1981) and is available even to non-
human species (e.g., Hare, Call, Agnetta, & Tomasello, 2000). It has also been
proposed that level 1 VPT is achieved via the computation of the other
person’s line of sight (Kessler & Rutherford, 2010; Michelon & Zacks, 2006;
Surtees, Apperly, & Samson, 2013) and that such computation occurs auto-
matically (Samson et al., 2010). For example, Samson et al. (2010) showed par-
ticipants pictures of a room with discs pinned on the left and/or right wall and
a centrally positioned human avatar facing either the left or the right wall (see
Figure 1). The discs were displayed in such a way that, on half of the trials,
some of these discs were not visible to the avatar. The authors found that
Figure 1. Upper panel: Illustration of the gaze cueing paradigm. A gazing face is ﬁrst
presented alone (SOA≥ 50 ms) followed by the presentation of a target (often a letter
to identify) at a location that is either congruent or incongruent with the gaze cue.
Lower panel: Illustration of the level-1 visual perspective-taking paradigm. Two
prompts indicate the perspective to take (here “YOU” instructs to take the self-perspec-
tive) and the perspective content to verify (here “2” refers to the number of discs) fol-
lowed by the presentation of a scene in which another person is presented
simultaneously (SOA = 0 ms) with the targets; the other person can either see the
same or a different number of discs than participants.
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when the participants were asked to verify the number of discs they could see
from their own point of view, they were slowed down and less accurate in
their judgments when the number of discs in the room did not match the
number of discs that the avatar could see, suggesting that participants auto-
matically processed what the avatar could see even when it was not relevant
for their judgment.
Interestingly, in a parallel line of research it has been shown that our atten-
tion is reﬂexively oriented towards where someone else is looking. This
phenomenon is typically observed in a gaze cueing paradigm where partici-
pants are faster at detecting or identifying an object when it appears in the
gaze direction of a preceding social cue (e.g., eye gaze or head orientation)
than when it appears in the opposite direction (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999, 2002; Langton & Bruce, 1999).
Both in the VPT and the gaze cueing paradigms, the other person is pre-
sented centrally on the screen and the typical effects on task performance indi-
cate that participants extracted directional information from the social cue. The
processing that follows the extraction of directional information is however
usually interpreted slightly differently between these two paradigms. In the
gaze cueing paradigm, the effect is traditionally explained in terms of a partici-
pant’s attentional shift to where the other person is looking at (attentional
cueing), while in the VPT paradigm the effect is discussed in terms of mentaliz-
ing about what the other person is seeing (for a discussion, see Heyes, 2014).
The results from both strands of research have, however, been taken as evi-
dence that we automatically compute where or what someone else is looking.
The notion of automaticity calls for a closer examination. Automaticity is a
complex concept in cognitive sciences which can be deﬁned based on three
characteristics (Moors & De Houwer, 2006): (1) the process is unintentional (i.e.,
“uncontrolled in terms of the goal to engage in the process”, p. 309), (2) the
process is efﬁcient (or effortless; i.e., “consumes little or no processing
resources or attentional capacity”, p. 317), and (3) the process is stimulus
driven (i.e., “produced by the mere presence of the stimulus”, p. 308). In
relation to the ﬁrst characteristic, there is evidence that the computation of
where/what someone else is looking at occurs even when it is not necessary
to do so and even at the cost of task performance: in both the gaze cueing
paradigm (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Mansﬁeld, Farroni,
& Johnson, 2003) and the VPT paradigm (Samson et al., 2010, Experiment 3;
Santiesteban, Catmur, Coughlan Hopkins, Bird, & Heyes, 2013, Experiment
2), participants are not instructed to pay attention to the gazer and the
gaze direction is not predictive of the location of the targets. Despite these
factors, participants still compute where/what the gazer is looking at.
Secondly, it has been shown with both the gaze cueing and the VPT para-
digms that the computation of where/what someone else is looking at is not
suppressed or down-modulated when participants are in a dual-task situation,
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supporting the view that the computation is “effortless” (Hayward & Ristic,
2013; Law, Langton, & Logie, 2010; Qureshi, Apperly, & Samson, 2010).
However, regarding the third characteristic, i.e., the triggering conditions,
the results so far are less clear and show apparently discrepant ﬁndings
across the VPT and the gaze cueing paradigms. Indeed, one puzzling
ﬁnding is that in the VPT paradigm the computation of what the other
person sees is found when the gazing person is presented simultaneously
with the object(s) to be processed, while in the gaze cueing paradigm the
attentional cueing effect is only found when the gaze cue is presented
between 50 and 800 ms prior to the object (i.e., with a Stimulus Onset Asyn-
chrony [SOA] > 0; Frischen, Bayliss, & Tipper, 2007) but not when the gaze
cue is presented simultaneously with the object (i.e., with a SOA = 0 ms ; Xu,
Tanaka, & Mineault, 2012). In other words, in the gaze cueing paradigm
(unlike in the VPT paradigm), the gazer has to be presented ﬁrst alone
without the competition of other objects for the cueing effect to be observed.
Such discrepant ﬁndings could be interpreted in two ways. Firstly, the compu-
tation involved in the gaze cueing and the VPT paradigms could be qualitat-
ively different (for example, the effect observed in the VPT paradigm could be
linked to the drawing of a line of sight leading to a more robust or sustained
effect while the effect observed in the gaze cueing paradigm could be due to a
more simple attentional shift, non-mentalizing process; see Furnaletto,
Becchio, Samson, & Apperly, in press; Heyes, 2014; Ramsey, Hansen, Apperly,
& Samson, 2013; Samson et al., 2010; Schurz et al., 2015, for a discussion). Sec-
ondly, and irrespectively as to whether the same computation is at play in
both paradigms, the attentional system could give a higher priority to the
other person in the VPT paradigm than in the classic gaze cueing paradigm.
A higher priority to the other person in the VPT paradigm would mean that
the processing of the other person (more speciﬁcally the extraction of the
directional cue and the subsequent processing of where or what the person
is looking at) could withstand better the competition for attention from
other objects in the scene. Importantly, this second explanation would indi-
cate that the mere presence of another person is, in fact, not sufﬁcient to
compute what or where the other person is looking at, and that instead
such a computation is dependent on contextual factors that allow for atten-
tion to give a priority to the other person. The current study focused on this
latter hypothesis with the aim to understand the nature of the relevant con-
textual factors and whether these factors need necessarily to be social factors.
Concretely, we modiﬁed the classic gaze cueing paradigm by adding, in a
stepwise fashion, features of the VPT paradigm without adding, however, the
perspective-taking instructions. By doing so, we wanted to see whether any of
these additional features would lead to the observation of a gaze cueing effect
at an SOA of 0 ms or whether the attentional system prioritizes the gazer over
other competing objects only in the social context of perspective taking.
VISUAL COGNITION 1023
A closer examination of the discrepant features across the VPT and classic
gaze cueing paradigms (see Figure 1) highlighted three elements other than
the perspective-taking context, that could explain why no gaze cueing effect
is observed when a 0 ms SOA is used while an inﬂuence of the other person is
observed in the VPT paradigm at such an SOA.
The ﬁrst discrepant element is related to the nature of the stimuli used in
the two paradigms. Visual salience (e.g., luminance contrast) is known to inﬂu-
ence the bottom-up processes that capture our attention to certain features of
the scene (Treisman & Gelade, 1980). The absolute visual salience of the gazer
as well as its relative salience compared to other elements in the scene may
thus have an impact on the extent to which attention is captured by the gazer
and where/what he is looking at. The stimuli of the VPT paradigm are quite
different to the ones that are classically used in the gaze cueing paradigm
in that the avatar contrasts sharply in terms of luminance (i.e., dark hair and
black shirt) with the rest of the scene (i.e., bright blue walls and bright red
discs pinned on the wall). It is thus possible that the visual appearance of
the stimuli of the VPT paradigm was more optimal to orient attention to
the gazer and then to where/what he is looking. The visual salience of the
directional information provided by the gazer is another factor that may
trigger the computation of where/what another person is looking when an
SOA of 0 ms is used. The stimuli of the VPT paradigm distinguish themselves
from the ones usually used in the gaze cueing paradigm in that the directional
information is conveyed by a full body avatar whose head and body are con-
gruently oriented sideways (and with the eyes barely visible). In contrast, in
the gaze cueing paradigm directional information is mainly provided by the
eyes themselves (sometimes also by the head orientation, e.g., Langton &
Bruce, 1999). Furthermore, the directional information provided by the
gazer is sometimes found to be more salient when different directional
cues (i.e., head and gaze) are oriented in the same direction than when
they point to opposite directions (Langton, 2000; Langton & Bruce, 2000;
but see Hietanen, 1999, 2002; Pomianowska, Germeys, Verfaillie, & Newell,
2012). The focus on body orientation and the congruency of the directional
information across body, head and gaze cues in the VPT paradigm may
thus facilitate the extraction of the directional information and hence facilitate
the computation of where/what the other person is looking at.
The second element is the overall processing time required across the two
types of paradigms. The overall reaction times for participants to judge their
own perspective in the VPT paradigm are about 100 to 300 ms longer than the
overall reaction times to detect or identify the target in the classic gaze cueing
paradigm (Frischen et al., 2007). The longer processing time in the VPT para-
digm may provide critical extra time for computing the gaze direction of the
other person and prioritizing attention to where/what the other person is
looking at.
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Finally, the third element relates to differing task instructions across the
two paradigms. Task instructions are known to inﬂuence how attention is
deployed on the task stimuli (Posner, 1980). In the gaze cueing paradigm, par-
ticipants are asked to detect or identify an object. Thus, the task instructions
do not direct attention to the gazer but to the surrounding objects. In the VPT
paradigm, participants are asked to judge what they see. Even though this
instruction does not directly direct the participants’ attention to the gazer
and should also direct attention to the surrounding objects, it has been
shown that merely asking participants to focus on their own perspective
directs their attention to the other person because they construe their per-
spective as distinct from the other person’s perspective (Abbate, Isgrò, Wick-
lund, & Boca, 2006; Gendolla & Wicklund, 2009; Hass, 1984; Stephenson &
Wicklund, 1983, 1984). Here the social mind-set induced by the self-perspec-
tive instruction may thus play a crucial role for attention prioritization. We
examined whether such prioritization could be achieved by a non-social
task instruction that directs attention to the gazer.
In a series of three experiments, we examined whether each of these
elements plays a causal role in the generation of a gaze cueing effect at an
SOA of 0 ms, indicating that a higher priority is given to the gazer and
where/what he is looking at compared to any other stimulus presented sim-
ultaneously. Experiment 1 tested for the role of visual salience (luminance
contrast and salience of directional information) by using the same stimuli
as the ones used in the VPT paradigm by Samson et al. (2010) in a gaze
cueing paradigm. Experiment 2 examined the role of processing time by
equating the overall latencies of the gaze cueing paradigm with that of the
VPT. Experiment 3 examined the effects of task instructions on attentional
deployment by making it necessary to look at the gazer in the gaze cueing
paradigm without perspective-taking instructions. In all three experiments,
we contrasted participants’ performance (speed and accuracy) at identifying
a target when the target appeared in a location congruent with the other
person’s gaze direction versus when the target appeared in a location incon-
gruent with the person’s gaze direction. The presence of a signiﬁcant gaze
congruency effect was taken as evidence that participants computed
where/what the other person is looking at. All three experiments were
approved by the ethics committee of the Psychological Sciences Research
Institute of the Université catholique de Louvain.
Experiment 1
Experiment 1 aimed to test the hypothesis that the stimuli used in the VPT
paradigm (Samson et al., 2010) attract attention more to the gazer (and, as
a consequence, facilitate the computation of where/what he is looking at)
than the stimuli classically used in the gaze cueing paradigm (e.g., Driver
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et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Hietanen, 1999) in terms of luminance
contrast and ease of extraction of the directional information. In order to test
this hypothesis, we developed a gaze cueing task with the visual stimuli of the
VPT task. This allowed us to determine whether the visual settings of the VPT
task play a critical role in producing a measurable gaze congruency effect at
the 0 ms SOA.
Wealsomanipulated the onset of the target relative to thepresentationof the
gaze cue with, on half of the trials, the target objects appearing simultaneously
with the gaze cue (SOA = 0 ms) and, on the other half of the trials, the target
objects appearing 300 ms after the gaze cue (SOA = 300 ms). We expected to
replicate in the300msSOAcondition theﬁndings thatparticipants’performance
to process the targets when they appear in a location congruent with the
location the gazer is looking at would be superior to when the targets appear
at the opposite location (e.g., Driver et al., 1999; Friesen, Moore, & Kingstone,
2005; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998). Furthermore, if the visual appearance of the
stimuli of the VPT task is what explains the inﬂuence of the other person in
the VPT paradigm at the 0 ms SOA, we should also ﬁnd in our modiﬁed gaze
cueing task a gaze congruency effect in the 0 ms SOA condition.
Method
Participants
A total of 26 healthy individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
participated in the experiment in return of 5 Euros (21 females, mean age:
24.22, age range: 18–31).
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on a 17-inch monitor (1024 × 68, 85 Hz, Dell M782p)
with the E-prime software (Psychology Software Tools, Pittsburgh, PA, USA)
running on a Dell Pentium 4 (2.8 GHz) computer. Participants sat at a distance
of approximately 40 cm from the screen.
Stimuli and procedure
For each trial, participants saw ﬁrst a ﬁxation cross displayed for 750 ms fol-
lowed by a 500 ms blank. They then saw a scene (19° × 11.5°) with an
avatar (the gazer; 1.5° × 8°) positioned in the centre of a blue room. The
avatar was always gender congruent with the participants’ gender. The
avatar faced either the left or the right wall (see Figure 2). One or two red
discs (the target object(s); 0.7° × 1.5° each, 1:1 probability) were presented
on one of the lateral walls at 6.5° from the gazer. Participants were instructed
to press “1” or “2” on the numerical keypad when, respectively, 1 or 2 red discs
were pinned on the wall. Directly following the participant’s response, a feed-
back “Correct”, “Incorrect”, or “No response” was presented for 1 s. A “No
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response” feedback was presented after 2 s had elapsed without a response
from the participant.
On half of the trials, the discs were displayed simultaneously with the gazer
and the background walls (0ms SOA condition) whereas in the other half of the
trials the red disc(s) appeared 300 ms after the presentation of the gazer and the
background walls (300ms SOA condition). Furthermore, on half of the trials, the
discs were presented in the location the gazer was looking at (congruent gaze
condition) whereas, on the other half of the trials, the discs appeared on the
opposite wall (incongruent gaze condition). Forty-eight trials were presented
in each of the four conditions that resulted from this 2 (SOA) × 2 (Congruency)
design. The trials were presented in random order across two blocks of 96 trials
precededby a 32 trials practice block. The task lasted approximately 12minutes.
Result
Reaction times (RT) for correct responses and error rates (ER) were combined
into an inverse efﬁciency score (IES), a unique measure of performance that
merges ERs and RTs by weighting the average RT by the ER (IES = RT /
(1-ER); Townsend & Ashby, 1978). Using the IES allows to homogenize the
different patterns of speed/accuracy trade-offs within a group of individuals
Figure 2. Illustration of the timing of the events on each trial of the modiﬁed gaze cueing
task of Experiment 1. On this trial, participants had to press on the key “2” because two
discs were visible in the room. The last screen displayed the feedback about participant’s
accuracy of response.
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and to compare several groups via a unique measure. However, the IES pre-
sents the main disadvantage that the RTs are non-linearly multiplied
(almost exponentially) as the ERs increase. This led Bruyer and Brysbaert
(2011) to argue that the use of the IES should be avoided if there is more
than 10% of erroneous responses (ER = .10). The observed percentages of
errors indicated that it was statistically appropriate to use the IES in the
present data analyses. Separate results for the RTs and ERs, and the full
ANOVA on the IES, can be found in the Supplementary information S1.
Table 1 shows the mean IES and RTs across experimental conditions.
Erroneous responses (1.4% of the data) and response omissions due to the
timeout procedure (0.02% of the data) were eliminated from the data set when
computing the median RTs. One participant’s overall accuracy was 3 SD below
the mean accuracy of the group and was thus removed from the analyses.
As we were speciﬁcally interested in measuring the gaze congruency
effect, we computed a gaze congruency index by subtracting the mean IES
on congruent gaze trials from the mean IES on incongruent trials. The gaze
congruency index was signiﬁcantly different from 0 in the 300 ms SOA con-
dition, t(24) = 4.077, p < .001, d = 0.82, but not in the 0 ms SOA condition, t
(24) < 1, p = .655, d = 0.09. Furthermore, the gaze congruency index in the
300 ms SOA condition was signiﬁcantly greater than the gaze congruency
index in the 0 ms SOA condition, t(24) = 4.013, p = .001, d = 0.80 (see Figure 3).
These results replicate previousﬁndings (e.g., Driver et al., 1999; Friesenet al.,
2005; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) indicating that participants’ performance was
inﬂuenced bywhere/what a gazer is looking at and showed a gaze-cuing effect
when using an SOA of 300 ms. Most importantly, despite the fact that we used
the visual stimuli proper to the VPT task, we found no evidence of gaze cueing
at an SOAof 0 ms. The nature of the stimuli used in the VPT task is thus notwhat
triggers the computation of where/what the other person is looking at.
Experiment 2
Experiment 2 aimed to test the hypothesis that the task complexity of the VPT
task allows for extra time for the inﬂuence of the gazing avatar to start and
modulate the task performance. In order to test this hypothesis, we developed
Table 1 Mean and standard deviation of IES and RT for congruent and incongruent trials
across experiments.
M(SD) IES RT
SOA 0 ms 300 ms 0 ms 300 ms
Congruency Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong Cong Incong
Exp 1 506 (59) 505 (61) 428 (53) 446 (63) 500 (62) 498 (61) 420 (52) 440 (64)
Exp 2 622 (84) 627 (89) 552 (69) 583 (80) 615 (83) 614 (82) 549 (68) 575 (79)
Exp 3 811 (149) 864 (169) 607 (130) 645 (130) 760 (127) 797 (144) 566 (107) 588 (114)
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a gaze cueing task that was matched in terms of overall response time to the
VPT task. We also ensured that the stimuli used in the VPT and the gaze cueing
tasks were matched in terms of visual appearance. Furthermore, as in Exper-
iment 1, we manipulated the SOA (0 ms versus 300 ms). We expected to repli-
cate the gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 300 ms but the critical question
was whether this effect would now also be found at an SOA of 0 ms. If the
increased task complexity of the novel gaze cueing task delays participants’
responses and through this gives a better opportunity for attention to be
attracted to the gazer and where/what he is looking at, then we should
ﬁnd a signiﬁcant gaze congruency effect with an SOA of 0 ms.
Method
Participants
A total of 26 healthy individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
participated in the experiment in return of 8 Euros (17 females, mean age:
21.50, age range: 18–30). An additional 26 participants took part in the
control VPT task (17 females, mean age: 21.57, age range: 18–28).
Apparatus
Identical to Experiment 1.
Figure 3. Gaze congruency indexes across Experiment 1, 2, and 3 in the modiﬁed gaze
cueing paradigms. SOA = stimulus onset asynchrony, IES = inverse efﬁciency score. Error
bars indicate the 95% conﬁdence intervals. ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Stimuli and procedure
The gaze cueing task. Participants were presented with similar room displays
as the ones used in Experiment 1. The room included one centrally positioned
avatar facing either the left or the right wall and no discs1 on the walls or one
to two discs pinned on one of the walls. There were two main changes to the
task (see Figure 4). (A series of pilot tests indicated that these were efﬁcient
ways to match the overall response times and task complexity across the
gaze cueing and VPT tasks.) Firstly, the discs were not red anymore but
were black with a ﬁne red or green contour. Secondly, the participants
were asked to verify whether two prompts presented before the room was
displayed matched the content of the room. The sequence of events within
a trial closely matched the sequence of events in the classic VPT task
(Samson et al., 2010). More speciﬁcally, participants were ﬁrst shown a
Figure 4. Illustration of the timing of the events on each trial of the modiﬁed gaze cueing
task of Experiment 2. On this trial, participants had to judge whether there was one disc
with a red border (see magniﬁed view of the discs used) visible in the room. The last
screen displayed the feedback about participant’s accuracy of response.
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colour prompt for 750 ms indicating which discs they had to take into account
(“RED” meant that participants should only take into account the black discs
with a red contour while “GREEN” meant that they had to take into account
the black discs with a green contour). After a 500 ms blank screen, participants
were presented with a number prompt (ranging from 0 to 2) for 750 ms. After
a 500 ms blank screen, the room was displayed and the participants had to
indicate whether the number prompt matched the number of discs with
the prompted colour contour displayed in the room by pressing the
upward arrow (yes) or downward arrow key (no). For example, following
the prompts “RED” and “2”, participants had to say whether there were two
black discs with a red contour in the room or not (“yes” or “no”). A 50 ms audi-
tory signal was displayed informing when participants could respond. This
feature was added to prevent participants from confusing trials from the 0
ms SOA condition with no disc in the room with trials from the 300 ms SOA
condition (in which the appearance of the discs is delayed). Directly following
the participant’s response, a feedback “Correct”, “Incorrect”, or “No response”
was presented for 1 s. A “No response” feedback was presented after 2 s had
elapsed without a response from the participant.
On one half of the trials, the black disc(s) were displayed simultaneously
with the gazer and the background walls (0 ms SOA condition) whereas on
the other half of the trials the black disc(s) appeared 300 ms after the presen-
tation of the scene (300 ms SOA condition). Furthermore, on half of the trials,
the target discs appeared at the location gazed at (congruent gaze condition)
whereas on the other half of the trials, the discs appeared on the opposite wall
(incongruent gaze condition). There were 32 matching trials and 32 mis-
matching trials in each of the four experimental conditions = 2 (SOA) × 2 (Con-
gruency). The two types of colour prompts (“RED” or “GREEN”) were equally
distributed across all experimental conditions. As in the original VPT para-
digm, mismatching trials were discarded from the analysis due to concerns
that they may artiﬁcially inﬂate the gaze congruency effect (the number
prompts in the mismatching trials of the congruent gaze condition do not cor-
respond to either the number of red, green, or total number of discs and are
thus particularly easy to reject). In addition, 64 ﬁller trials with no disc or with
discs on the two lateral walls were added to balance the occurrences of each
number prompt (0, 1, or 2) across conditions; these ﬁller trials were removed
from the analyses. The trials were presented in random order across four
blocks of 80 trials preceded by a 40 trials practice block. The task lasted
approximately 32 minutes.
The control VPT task. A VPT task modiﬁed to closely match the visual and
design settings of the gaze cueing task was added to directly compare
1The trials without disc were used as catch trials.
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overall reaction times and performance between the two paradigms. The VPT
task was identical to the gaze cueing task except that the colour prompt was
replaced by a perspective prompt indicating which perspective participants
had to judge (“YOU” or “SHE”/“HE”). Participants had hence to judge
whether the number prompt matched the number of discs that either they
themselves (critical self-perspective trials) or the avatar (ﬁller other-perspec-
tive trials)2 could see (see Figure 4). The colour of the disc contours varied
as in the gaze cueing task but was not relevant for the VPT task. The gaze con-
gruent condition corresponded to trials where participants had to judge their
own perspective (“YOU” prompts) and where the discs appeared in the line of
sight of the avatar. The gaze incongruent condition corresponded to trials
where participants had to judge their own perspective (“YOU” prompts) and
where the discs appeared on the opposite wall to the one the avatar was
gazing at. The design (2 (SOA) × 2 (Congruency)) was identical to the gaze
cueing task, including in terms of the number of matching, mismatching,
and ﬁller trials, which were identically distributed across the four experimental
conditions. The two types of perspective prompts (“YOU” or “HE”/“SHE”) were
equally distributed across all experimental conditions. The task lasted approxi-
mately 32 minutes.
Result
In order to verify that the overall response times and overall performance was
matched between the gaze cueing task and the VPT task, we conducted two t-
tests for independent samples with the task condition as a between-subjects
variable. The overall RT (averaged over Congruency and SOA) in the gaze
cueing task (M = 601 ms) was not signiﬁcantly different from the overall RT
in the VPT task (M = 546 ms), t(48) = 1.635, p = .108. RTs on correct responses
and ERs were then merged to use the IES. The overall performance, as
measured with IES, in the gaze cueing task (M = 614) was not signiﬁcantly
different from the overall performance in the VPT task (M = 578), t(48) < 1,
p = .334. Thus, the gaze cueing and VPT tasks were now matched in terms
of processing time and efﬁciency.
Full results of the VPT task (for the RTs, ERs, and IES) are presented in the
Supplementary information S2. We present below the results of the gaze
cueing task.
Erroneous responses (1.4% of the data) and response omissions due to the
timeout procedure (0.09% of the data) were eliminated from the data set
when computing the median RTs. RTs on correct responses and ERs were
2Filler other-perspective trials are included to ensure that participants maintain a perspective-taking mind-
set. If only self-perspective-taking trials are included, after a certain time participants risk to construe the
task more like in the gaze cueing task (counting the discs) rather than as a perspective-taking task (what
do “I” see).
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merged to use the IES. Separate results for the RTs and ERs, and the full
ANOVA on the IES, can be found in the Supplementary information S2. One
participant’s overall accuracy was 3 SD below the mean accuracy of the
group and two participants’ congruency index were 3 SD higher than the
mean congruency index of the group; these participants were thus
removed from the analyses.
The gaze congruency index (computed in the same way as in the previous
analyses) was signiﬁcantly different from 0 in the 300 ms SOA condition, t(22)
= 3.911, p = .001, d = 0.81, but not signiﬁcantly different from 0 in the 0 ms
SOA condition, t(22) < 1, p = .438, d = 0.16 (see Figure 3 and Table 1 for the
mean IES and RTs per experimental condition). Furthermore, the gaze con-
gruency index was signiﬁcantly higher in the 300 ms SOA condition than in
the 0 ms SOA condition, t(22) = 2.712, p = .013, d = 0.57. These results replicate
the gaze congruency effect with an SOA of 300 ms (e.g., Driver et al., 1999;
Friesen et al., 2005; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998) despite the increase in proces-
sing time. Importantly, however, there was no gaze congruency effect with an
SOA of 0 ms. Consequently, the hypothesis according to which the task com-
plexity or the working memory load of the VPT task allows more time for trig-
gering the computation of where/what another person is looking at an SOA of
0 ms is not supported.
Experiment 3
Experiment 3 aimed to test the hypothesis that the different task instructions
across the classic gaze cueing paradigm and the VPT paradigm lead to a differ-
ent attentional deployment on the scene. Through the perspective-taking
instructions of the VPT task, attention would be deployed on the scene in
such a way that it encompasses the gazer (and hence what he is looking at)
even when participants judge their own perspective. Several studies
suggest that this may result from the fact that perspective taking is about dif-
ferentiating the self from another and that even when we think about the self,
attention is naturally drawn to the other (e.g., Abbate et al., 2006; Gendolla &
Wicklund, 2009; Hass, 1984; Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983). In contrast, the
instructions of a classic gaze cueing task only draw attention to the objects
present in a scene. In order to test this hypothesis, we modiﬁed the gaze
cueing task so that attention is artiﬁcially drawn to the location of the
avatar (importantly, however, without explicitly asking to pay attention to
the avatar). This was achieved by superimposing the instruction prompts on
the avatar. We again manipulated the SOA (0 versus 300 ms).
We expected to replicate the gaze congruency effect when the SOA is 300
ms and, as there are now two sources of attentional narrowing down onto the
gazer (i.e., constricting attentional resources to a small portion of the visual
ﬁeld; Eriksen & Yeh, 1985), one source being the presentation of the gazer
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prior to the peripheral objects and the other source being the location of the
task instructions, we could also expect that for these reasons the gaze con-
gruency effect would be stronger than in Experiments 1 and 2. Furthermore,
the crucial question was whether our task modiﬁcations were sufﬁcient to ﬁnd
the gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms.
Note that we also ran again a control experiment in which we used the
modiﬁed location of the task instruction in the classic VPT paradigm. The
results showed that the inﬂuence of the other person in that paradigm
could still be observed under those modiﬁed conditions (see Supplementary
information S4).
Method
Participants
A total of 25 healthy individuals with normal or corrected-to-normal vision
participated in the experiment in return of 8 Euros (19 females, mean age:
21.70, age range: 18–28).
Apparatus
Identical to Experiment 1.
Stimuli and procedure
Participants were presented with the same stimuli and instructions as in Exper-
iment 2 except for four changesmade to the task. Firstly, thediscswerenotblack
with a redor green contour butwere fully coloured in red or green (see Figure 5).
Secondly, the colour and number prompts were not presented before the room
wasdisplayedbutwerepresented simultaneouslywith the room, superimposed
on the avatar’s chest. This was done to force attention to be deployed on the
avatar (without referring to perspective taking, however). Thirdly, the “GREEN”
colour prompt was changed to “ALL” and meant that participants had to take
into account all colours of discs. For example, participants were shown the
room, read “ALL 2” on the avatar’s chest, and thus had to say whether there
were two discs in the room or not, no matter their colour. This change was
made tomatchmore closely the effects of the perspective prompts on attention
deployment (“ALL” matching the “SELF” prompt by encompassing all discs and
“RED” matching the “SHE”/“HE” prompt by encompassing sometimes only a
subset of discs). Fourthly, the discs displayed on the same wall were either all
red or all green to reduce the cognitive demand of selective attention in the
“RED” colour instruction condition. (Otherwise, the green disc would have
been a nearby, and thus potent, distractor.)
The design (2 (SOA: 0 vs. 300 ms) × 2 (Congruency: congruent vs. incongru-
ent gaze)) was identical to Experiment 2, including the number of matching,
mismatching, and ﬁller trials, which were identically distributed across the
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four experimental conditions. The two types of colour prompts (“RED” or
“ALL”) were equally distributed across all experimental conditions. The task
lasted approximately 22 minutes and contained four blocks of 80 trials pre-
ceded by a practice block of 24 trials.
Result
RTs on correct responses and ERs were merged to use the IES. Separate results
for the RTs and ERs, and the full ANOVA on the IES, can be found in the Sup-
plementary information S3.
Erroneous responses (2.1%) and response omissions due to the timeout
procedure (0.02% of the data) were eliminated from the data set when com-
puting the median RTs. Matching trials with red colour instructions were pre-
sented with a zero digit prompt (“RED 0”) when the discs were all green (unlike
in Experiment 2, discs were either all green or all red). Several participants
reported that the absence of red discs following “RED 0” led to a prepotent
“no” answer, which actually had to be suppressed to accurately respond
“yes”. This artiﬁcially hampered task performance (the mean accuracy on
these trials was 3 SD below the overall accuracy) and therefore those trials
were removed from the analyses.
Figure 5. Illustration of the timing of the events on each trial of the modiﬁed gaze cueing
task of Experiment 3. On this trial, participants had to judge whether there were two red
discs visible in the room (see magniﬁed view of the colour and number prompts super-
imposed on the avatar). The last screen displayed the feedback about participant’s accu-
racy of response.
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The gaze congruency index (computed in the same way as in the
previous analyses) was signiﬁcantly different from 0 in the 300 ms SOA con-
dition, t(24) = 3.025, p = .006, d = 0.60, and, this time, also in the 0 ms SOA
condition, t(24) = 5.089, p < .001, d = 1.01 (see Figure 3 and Table 1 for the
mean IES and RTs per experimental condition). Moreover, the gaze con-
gruency index in the 300 ms SOA condition was not signiﬁcantly different
from the gaze congruency index in the 0 ms SOA condition, t(24) < 1,
p = .458, d = 0.15. The comparison of the gaze congruency indexes across
Experiment 1 in the 300 ms SOA condition (which is representative of the
average 16 ms gaze cueing effect calculated in the review by Lachat, Conty,
Hugueville, & George, 2012) and Experiment 3, showed that the index was sig-
niﬁcantly higher in Experiment 3, t(49) = 3.115, p = .003, d = 0.89.
Thus, these results replicate the ﬁnding of the gaze congruency effect with
an SOA of 300 ms (e.g., Driver et al., 1999; Friesen et al., 2005; Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998) and show that this effect was even further enhanced. Impor-
tantly, the gaze congruency effect was found for the ﬁrst time with an SOA of
0 ms. This ﬁnding strongly indicates that drawing attention to the location
of the gazer through task instructions plays a causal role in the computation
of where/what another person is looking.
General Discussion
Across three experiments in which participants completed a gaze cueing task,
our results replicated the well-known ﬁnding that participants perform better
in identifying a target presented in the line of sight of a gazer than a target
presented outside of its line of sight when the gazer is presented 300 ms
prior to the target (i.e., with an SOA of 300 ms; Driver et al., 1999; Friesen &
Kingstone, 1998). Furthermore, we showed that the presence of a gaze con-
gruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms cannot be systematically found despite
matching the gaze cueing task in terms of the appearance of the stimuli
(Experiment 1) or processing time (Experiment 2) with the VPT task. The
gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms was only found when the instruc-
tions speciﬁcally directed participants’ attention to the avatar’s location by
having a part of the instructions superimposed on the avatar (Experiment
3). Altogether, this pattern of results provides important insights into the con-
ditions in which we process where/what another person is looking at.
Revisiting the automaticity claim
Our results show that once attention is drawn to aperson (evenwhen there is no
explicit instruction to take into account that person’s visual experience), what is
in the line of sight of the person is automatically computed and inﬂuences judg-
ments we make about what we ourselves see. This is truly independent of
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whether participants are placed in a gaze cueing or a VPT task. Importantly,
however, our results show that whether attention is drawn to the person in
the ﬁrst place is context-dependent: the social mind-set created by a perspec-
tive-taking task (even when participants are only required to judge their own
perspective) seems to naturally draw attention to the other person; whereas
in a gaze cueing task, attention has to be drawn by external factors such as
the prior presentation of the gazer alone without competing stimuli (as with
the classic 300 ms SOA) or the presentation of task-relevant information in
the same location as the avatar (as in Experiment 33). This means that it is not
themerepresenceof another person inourﬁeldof view that triggers attentional
cueing or line of sight computation but the act of looking at or attending to
another person. This has implications for the question of the level of automati-
city with which we compute where/what someone else is looking at.
In relation to the three characteristics of an automatic process deﬁned by
Moors and De Houwer (2006) (i.e., whether the process is unintentional, efﬁ-
cient, and stimulus driven), previous studies have shown evidence that, both
for the gaze cueing and the VPT paradigms, the computation of where/what
someone else is looking at occurs even when it is not required for the efﬁcient
task performance (Driver et al., 1999; Friesen & Kingstone, 1998; Mansﬁeld
et al., 2003; Samson et al., 2010; Santiesteban et al., 2013) and even when par-
ticipants are in a dual-task situation (Hayward & Ristic, 2013; Law et al., 2010;
Qureshi et al., 2010).
However, regarding the third characteristic of automaticity, our results here
clearly show that the mere presence of the other person is not sufﬁcient to
trigger the computation of where/what that person is looking at. Hence, com-
puting where/what another person is looking at is not stimulus driven but
context-dependent. Thus, in a situation where a person is surrounded by
objects (like a classic gaze cueing task at an SOA of 0 ms), attention is probably
distributed across the scene and this does not seem to be sufﬁcient to trigger
the computation of where/what another person is looking at. Instead, atten-
tion needs to prioritize the gazing person (compared to other objects in the
scene) before the computation of what the gazing person is looking at can
happen. The prioritization can be achieved in at least three contexts. First,
in the context of the VPT task, attention seems to be narrowed down to the
gazing person because of its high relevance for the perspective-taking instruc-
tions. The high relevance seems to sufﬁce to prioritize the processing of the
gazing person over the processing of the competing peripheral target and
would explain why there is an effect of what the other person is seeing at
an SOA of 0 ms with the VPT task. Second, in the context of the classic gaze
3It should be noted that while we can conclude that the presentation of task-relevant information in the
same location as the avatar is critical to produce the gaze congruency effect at the 0 ms SOA, we cannot
exclude the possibility that the effect resulted, in fact, from a combined effect of the task instruction with
both/either the visual settings and/or the task complexity.
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cueing paradigm with an SOA of at least 50 ms, attention is narrowed down to
the gazing person because it appears ﬁrst alone without competing objects in
the scene, which is why a gaze congruency effect can be consistently found at
an SOA of 300 ms across all experiments. Third, in the context of goal-relevant
information placed on the same location as the gazing person, attention is
narrowed down to the area of the gazing person in order to read the instruc-
tions. This also seems to be sufﬁcient to prioritize the processing of the gazing
person over the competing peripheral target and explains why we found a
gaze congruency effect at an SOA of 0 ms in Experiment 3 even though
there was no social task instructions. In sum, the computation of where/
what another person is looking at does not seem to occur when the gazing
person and the peripheral target appear simultaneously unless attention is
narrowed down to the gazing person through the inﬂuence of social or
non-social factors.
Interestingly, the mere fact of judging one’s own visual perspective is sufﬁ-
cient to trigger the computation of what another person is seeing. Following
the seminal ﬁnding of Hass (1984), Wicklund and colleagues (Abbate et al.,
2006; Gendolla & Wicklund, 2009; Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983, 1984) have
repeatedly shown that, when we are asked to focus on ourselves, we are
more prompt to take another person’s perspective. These authors stated
that such self-focus exacerbates our awareness of how distinct we are from
others and how we are perceived by others, which increases the salience of
the other person’s perspective (Stephenson & Wicklund, 1983). This latter
view is line with the observation that young children who fail to take
another person’s visual perspective are those who fail to differentiate the
self from others (Flavell, Botkin, Fry, Wright, & Jarvis, 1968, 1981). Altogether,
it seems likely that, in the VPT paradigm, when participants are explicitly asked
to take their own visual perspective but not the avatar’s visual perspective,
they are put in a social mind-set that increases the salience of the gazer
and thus the amount of attention deployed on it.
Computing where someone is looking at or what someone is seeing?
Do participants compute a “mental” state (what the gazer “sees”) or do they
simply extract a directional feature (where the gazer is looking at) that orients
attention? Furthermore, do they compute the same in both types of paradigms?
Someevidence suggests thatparticipants computea “seeing”mental statewhen
observing the gazer in the gaze cueingparadigm (Teufel, Alexis, Clayton, &Davis,
2010) or in the VPT paradigm (Furnaletto et al., in press). Teufel et al. (2010) have
shown, for example, that when the gazer wore goggles that were told to be
opaque, participants’ processing of a subsequent target was much less affected
by the gazer’s head orientation than when the gazer wore similar goggles that
were told to be transparent. Furnaletto et al. (in press) showed the same effect
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in the VPT paradigm: when making self-perspective judgements, participants
were not inﬂuenced anymore by what was in front of the gazer if they knew
that the gazer wore opaque goggles. Similarly, the gaze congruency effect in a
gaze cueing paradigm is larger when participants attribute a higher degree of
agency to the gazer (Wiese, Wykowska, Zwickel, & Müller, 2012). These results
indicate thatparticipantsextractmore than just adirectional cuewhenobserving
the gazer in both the gaze cueing and the VPT paradigms. Other research shows,
however, a more nuanced picturedwith the report of nomodulation of the gaze
congruency effect when an obstacle (a barrier instead of opaque goggles) is
present in the gazer’s line of sight (Cole, Smith, & Atkinson, 2015). Further
research is needed to investigate the possible interplays between extracting a
directional cue and computing what the gazer is seeing as this may occur
through separate processing stages (e.g., Ramsey et al., 2013; Wiese et al., 2012).
Conclusion
Humans are sensitive to where and what other people are looking at.
However, the mere presence of another person in the ﬁeld of view is not suf-
ﬁcient to compute where/what the other person is looking at. In that sense,
such a computation is not entirely stimulus-driven and hence not fully auto-
matic. Instead, attention ﬁrst needs to be narrowed down to the other person
in order to prevent competition from other potential sources of attention
capture or orienting. The social mind-set induced by perspective-taking
instructions (even when one only focuses on his/her own perspective) pro-
vides a powerful trigger to compute where and what the other person is
looking at by prioritizing attention to the other person. We showed also
that non-social factors can help as well prioritizing attention to the other
person and trigger the computation of where and what the other person is
looking at. Such ﬁndings open new avenues for investigating the origin of
spontaneous perspective-taking difﬁculties in some clinical populations (e.
g., autism spectrum disorders; Senju, Southgate, White, & Frith, 2009; Senju
et al., 2010) and ways this could be compensated for.
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